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MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND ENEMY COMBATANTS
"Justices Reject Gitmo Tribunals"
USA Today
June 30, 2006
Joan Biskupic and Laura Parker
The fate of more than 400 detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was thrown into
question when the Supreme Court rejected
President Bush's plan to hold military
tribunals for foreign terrorism suspects.
In a 5-3 vote Thursday that brought a
dramatic end to the court's term, the justices
said Bush exceeded his authority by setting
up the trial system without authorization
from Congress. The justices said Bush's
plan-which would not allow a detainee to
see all the evidence against him or attend all
court hearings in his case-lacked sufficient
protections for detainees. The court said the
plan violated the U.S. Military Code of
Justice and the Geneva Conventions dealing
with prisoners of war.
The five-justice majority led by John Paul
Stevens also said a congressional resolution
passed just after the Sept. 11, 2001. attacks
did not grant Bush as much authority to fight
terrorism as his administration claimed. The
administration has said the resolution gave
Bush the power to impose the tribunal
system. The court's finding could have
repercussions for other Bush policies,
including a secret surveillance program
overseen by the National Security Agency.
The ruling came in a case involving Salim
Hamdan, a Yemeni accused of being a guard
for Osama bin Laden and delivering
weapons to al-Qaeda. It forces the
administration to devise another way to try
foreign terror suspects and possibly to seek
Congress' approval.
Bush and Pentagon officials said they were
reviewing the ruling. It was unclear what
would become of the 14 Guantanamo
detainees who have been designated for
tribunals at the prison that has spurred
international controversy. Bush said he
would work with Congress on whether
"military tribunals will be an avenue" for
terror suspects. Absent action by Congress.,
Bush could court-martial detainees under
military law.
"This is a blockbuster decision," said Sen.
John Cornyn, R-Texas, a supporter of Bush.
"But (the court) opened the door to a
legislative remedy."
Critics of Bush's moves to hold foreigners
in Cuba indefinitely and keep them out of
civilian courts suggested the prison could be
closed. It was set up "to evade the
jurisdiction of federal courts," said Gene
Fidell of the National Institute of Military
Justice. "The whole purpose has been
undercut."
Stevens, a World War II veteran,
emphasized that Bush cannot go it alone in
the war on terrorism. After Stevens read the
ruling, Justice Antonin Scalia read an
acerbic dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas
then read a dissent. noting it was the first
time in 15 years on the court he had been
moved to announce his dissent. He said
Bush, as commander in chief, could form
the tribunals.
Scalia and Thomas were joined by Justice
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Samuel Alito. Chief Justice John Roberts
did not participate; he had been on a lower
court that upheld Bush's plan. Stevens'
majority included Anthony Kennedy, David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer.
4




The Supreme Court decided the war-on-
terrorism military commission case
(Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 05-184) on June 29.
Sometime in the next week or two, Congress
is expected to vote on a bill crafted by the
White House and key Senate Republicans in
reaction to Hamdan.
The Supreme Court's Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
decision left at least two constitutional
questions lingering, finding no need to
respond to them. Both are now lurking in the
background as Congress prepares to
consider legislation that would narrow the
rights of terrorism suspects being held at the
military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-
a dozen or two facing war crimes charges,
hundreds facing no charges.
The first question is whether Congress has
the authority, under its control of federal
court jurisdiction, to deny the Supreme
Court an opportunity to hear a habeas
challenge to detention and to potential trial
of Guantanamo detainees on war crimes
charges. More specifically, the question is
whether a detainee could pursue an "original
writ of habeas" directly in the Court, even if
Congress passed the pending compromise
White House-Senate Republican post-
Hamdan bill (introduced last week as S.
3930 and as part of S. 3929, a sweeping bill
that also includes new restrictions on court
review of foreign intelligence wiretapping
that reaches Americans using the telephone
or Internet connections in the U.S.)
The second question is whether Congress
can suspend the writ of habeas corpus
altogether, by simply denying any judge-
including any Supreme Court Justice-the
authority to hear any habeas case brought by
a detainee captured since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001.
Both questions were put before the Court in
Hamdan, but the Court concluded "we find
it unnecessary to reach either of these
arguments" (made by Salim Ahmed
Hamdan's lawyers). It interpreted the
Detainee Treatment Act, by its own
language, as not taking away the courts'
authority (including the Supreme Court's
authority) to decide the Hamdan case, since
it was pending before the DTA was passed
late last year. The Court did note, though (in
footnote 15),. that interpreting a law to
"entirely preclude review of a pure question
of law by any court would give rise to
substantial constitutional questions."
It appears that that is exactly what S. 3930
(and Title I of S. 3929) would do. Section 6,
"Habeas Corpus Matters." strikes out the
language of the DTA upon which the
Supreme Court found the Hamdan case to
be still within its reach, and presumably, still
within reach of the lower courts in
Washington, D.C.
In place of that version, the new bill states:
"No court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
on or behalf of an alien detained by the
United States who (A) is currently in United
States custody; and (B) has been determined
by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination." The provision
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goes on to say that "any other action"
brought by a detainee would have to be
brought in the D.C. Circuit Court, but that
would be open to a narrower range of issues
than a normal habeas petition. (Note that
these provisions are not limited to detainees
now at Guantanamo.)
To make explicit that previously pending
cases (including, presumably, Hamdan's
continuing case), the White House-GOP
leadership bill includes a new effective date
provision, reading: "The amendments made
. . . shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all
cases, without exception, pending or after
the date of the amendment of this Act which
relate to any aspect of the detention,
transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
detention of an alien detained by the United
States since September 11, 2001."
That would seem clearly to apply to
hundreds of pending habeas cases by
detainees. now awaiting a decision in a
packet of two appeals in the D.C. Circuit.
and in the continuing consideration of the
Hamdan case in the wake of the Supreme
Court ruling. Thus, if Congress passes the
bill as presently written, the D.C. Circuit
presumably would be the first to resolve the
issue, although it is conceivable that some
detainees' counsel would attempt to bring a
new habeas challenge in District Court to
test the new provisions, and perhaps an
original habeas in the Supreme Court for a
more direct test.
The timing of Senate and House
consideration of the new measure is not
fixed at this point, but it is understood to be
imminent.
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"What Rights for Terrorists? Hamdan v. Rumsfeld"
The San Diego Union-Tribune
August 6, 2006
Glen Sulmasy and John Yoo
In its decision in Hamdan v.
rejecting President Bush's
commissions for the trial of






Justice John Stevens, writing for Justices
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer and the wandering Anthony
Kennedy, evaded Congress' order that the
court not decide any cases arising from the
detention of enemy combatants at the
Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, camp. They
narrowed Congress' authorization for the
president to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those responsible
for the Sept. 11 attacks. They overlooked
centuries of American history in which
presidents from George Washington to FDR
used military commissions to try enemy
combatants for war crimes. They essentially
overruled the central lessons of three
Supreme Court decisions from World War II
upholding the use of military commissions.
But believe it or not, these are not the worst
aspects of the court's decision. In an effort
to interfere with the way the elected
branches of our government have chosen to
wage war against al-Qaeda, they interpreted
a law recognizing military commissions to
require the United States to follow what is
known as "Common Article 3" of the
Geneva Conventions. While limited only to
military trials, Hamdan suggests the
possibility that the courts will order the
United States to apply Common Article 3 to
other operations against jihadists who do not
wear uniforms nor display any distinctive
signs, systematically flout the laws of war.
and are neither parties nor signatories to the
Geneva Conventions. Hamdan has the
potential to straight-jacket our armed forces
well beyond the narrow issue of war crimes
trials.
A Stretch? You Bet.
It is critical to clarify where Common
Article 3 really applies and what it actually
demands. Under the Geneva Conventions,
prisoner of war status is reserved for
captured soldiers in the regular armed forces
of nations that have signed the treaties.
POWs receive the gold standard of
treatment: they cannot be placed in cells,
they need only provide name, rank and serial
number, and they are entitled to a great
many privileges and benefits, such as
retaining their uniform. unit structure and
chain of command.
These rules have in mind the conflicts
between the large conscript armies of World
Wars I and II. It provides protections to
those who follow the laws of wars: do not
target civilians deliberately and restrict
violence to combatants.
The major purpose of these provisions is to
ensure, through treaty, that reciprocity be
afforded to all nations and their armed
forces once engaged in combat. Al-Qaeda
did not exist at the time of the drafting of the
Geneva Conventions, and affording such
protections was never in the minds of the
signatories-certainly not the United States.
Al-Qaeda is not a nation state and could not
be., nor will it ever be party to such treaties.
It has no intention of following any of the
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laws of war. In fact, its pnimary tactics-
targeting and killing civilians, taking
hostages and executing prisoners-are
designed specifically to violate any
standards of civilized warfare.
Our conflict with al-Qaeda cannot trigger
the general POW protections of the Geneva
Conventions, because al-Qaeda is not a
party to the treaties.
Common Article 3 applies to certain fighters
who do not meet the standards for a POW It
sets minimum standards "in the case of
armed conflict not of an international
character." Its inclusion in 1949 cured a
major gap in the Geneva Conventions. The
original conventions did not set rules for
internal civil wars between a government
and resistance or rebel groups. Common
Article 3 extended minimum protections to
detainees who were not fighting on behalf of
the armed forces of another nation, but not
those due to POWs. It requires, for example,
that "persons taking no active part in the
hostilities," including the sick, wounded and
captured, "be treated humanely." They are to
be protected against "violence to life and
person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture."
The basic purpose of Common Article 3-
humane treatment-is already the policy of
the United States. But Common Article 3
also contains some ambiguous provisions. It
prohibits "outrages upon personal dignity. in
particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment," which it does not define. It only
allows the use of a "regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples," which it again leaves
undefined.
An example from Hamdan itself illustrates
how ambiguous these terms can be. Under
the Pentagon's rules on the procedures for
military commissions, a court may exclude
the defendant from the courtroom if
classified information is to be presented. His
defense attorney may be present, but not the
defendant. This makes a great deal of sense.
We would not want al-Qaeda operatives
directly learning the sources and methods
used by American intelligence to track and
capture them. Al-Qaeda has shown that it
quickly adapts to outsmart our strategies and
tactics. Does preventing an al-Qaeda
defendant access to such information
constitute a violation of "judicial guarantees
that are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples?"
The Supreme Court seemed to think so, but
we believe many would agree that the
military commission rule is a reasonable
compromise that allows for the defendant's
interests to be represented but without
harming national security during an ongoing
war.
Our conflict with al-Qaeda does not fit
within the general Geneva Convention rules
for wars between nation-states. Al-Qaeda
terrorists are not legally eligible for the
rights granted to POWs. But the war on
terrorism does not fall within Common
Article 3 either. The United States is not
fighting an internal civil war. As Justice
Clarence Thomas notes in his vigorous
Hamdan dissent, the war against al-Qaeda
and its supporters is clearly one of an
"international character." The battlefield
reaches beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, to
New York City, Washington, D.C., London,
Bali and Madrid. The war that began with
the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon on 9/11 is certainly nothing
like the internal civil wars in the minds of
Common Article 3's drafters in 1949. We
are not fighting a liberation movement of
Americans who want to overthrow the
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government. We are fighting something that
lay completely outside the experience of
those who wrote Geneva after World War II:
an international terrorist organization with
the power to inflict destruction on a par with
the armed forces of a nation.
Hamdan also disregards the distinctions
between lawful and illegal combatants. The
enemy we now fight, and will fight for the
foreseeable future, does not abide by the
laws of war. Any incentive to follow the
rules of civilized warfare is removed if they
receive the same rights as those who
scrupulously obey the Geneva Conventions.
In applying Common Article 3 to the
jihadists, we now equate illegal combatants
to ordinary armed forces. By affording
Geneva Convention protections to al-Qaeda,
we would be legitimizing their form of
warfare.
This is a dangerous path to follow. Al-Qaeda
uses our laws and treaties against us while
violating the same humane principles we
hold dear. Al-Qaeda and those who hate the
Western way of life are using our respect for
the laws of war against our armed forces and
are trying to open the door to claims of war
crimes based on ambiguous terms. It is
telling that the week after the decision was
handed down, al-Qaeda in Iraq offered a
video on an Islamist Web site of the two
U.S. soldiers captured in Iraq-showing
them beheaded and their chests cut wide
open. Can we ever expect humane treatment
and reciprocity from terrorists? Never.
In trying to force Common Article 3 onto a
conflict that stretches beyond national
borders-but with an international terrorist
organization rather than a nation-the
Supreme Court is trying to force a round peg
into a square hole. We can have a legitimate
debate on whether to update the Geneva
Conventions to ensure humane principles
are applied in conflicts with terrorist
organizations such as al-Qaeda. But as it
stands now, as a matter of both law and
policy, such application to al-Qaeda only
hurts the United States in its efforts to
protect the nation against international
terror-both now and in the foreseeable
future.
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The terror legislation set to be signed into
law Tuesday by President Bush sits atop an
ideological fault line that sharply divides the
U.S. Supreme Court and highlights the
emerging power of Justice Anthony
Kennedy.
The new law rejects at least five key
holdings by the liberal wing of the court and
sets the stage for what many analysts believe
will be yet another historic showdown
between the courts, the president, and
Congress.
Mr. Bush's authorization of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 will trigger a
barrage of challenges asking judges to strike
down the law as illegal, unconstitutional, or
both. And it has sparked a heated debate
among legal scholars and lawmakers.
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen
Specter (R) of Pennsylvania, who voted for
the law, nonetheless told his colleagues just
prior to its passage that he doubted the
Military Commissions Act would survive
judicial scrutiny. Others disagreed. "I bet
you dollars to doughnuts when the Supreme
Court gets hold of our work product, they
are going to approve it," Sen. Lindsey
Graham (R) of South Carolina said in a
speech on the Senate floor.
The Military Commissions Act of 2006
establishes rules for trying Al Qaeda
suspects for war crimes before special
military tribunals. It somewhat narrows the
protections of the Geneva Conventions
available to detainees in the war on terror.
And it tosses several hundred detainee
lawsuits out of the federal courts, replacing
rigorous habeas corpus review with a more
constrained and streamlined appeals process.
The sharp divide at the Supreme Court is
driven by a fundamental disagreement over
the proper level of judicial oversight of the
war on terror. Liberal justices seek more
aggressive oversight to protect individual
liberties. Conservatives favor granting more
deference and flexibility to the president/
commander in chief during times of war.
Kennedy's Key Role
Although the votes of specific justices have
sometimes been difficult to predict, there are
signs that a familiar pattern is emerging in
cases dealing with the war on terror. Just as
in hot-button social issues like affirmative
action and so-called partial-birth abortion,
the balance of power in potential landmark
national-security cases appears increasingly
to rest in the hands of Justice Kennedy.
Of the three major high-court precedents
dealing with the war on terror-the Hamdi
and Rasul decisions announced in 2004 and
the Hamdan decision in June 2006-
Kennedy voted in the majority in all three.
Most important, his was the least restrictive
opinion of the five-justice liberal majority
that struck down Bush's military
commission process in June. That is,
Kennedy was reluctant to go as far as
Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer in
limiting Bush's options in the war on terror.
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However, he was even more reluctant to
grant the president the broad discretion that
analysts say would have resulted in the
approach favored by Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito.
Instead, Kennedy joined the liberal wing in
the Hamdan decision, but once there, he
adopted a more centrist stance. He invited
Congress to strike the proper balance
between protecting national security while
also upholding international human rights
treaties. "Congress, not the court, is the
branch in the better position to undertake the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not
inconsistent with the national interest or
international justice," Kennedy wrote in his
concurrence to the Hamdan decision.
The Republican-controlled Congress eagerly
accepted the invitation. But if Justice
Stevens's Hamdan decision was a rebuke of
Bush's terror policies, as many analysts
have opined, the Military Commissions Act
is a counterrebuke of the liberal wing of the
high court-including Kennedy.
The new law rejects much of the liberal
wing's approach in the Rasul and Haindan
decisions.
* It rejects the high court's view (in the
Rasul decision) that suspected Al Qaeda
members detained at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, must be afforded the right to file
habeas corpus challenges in U.S. courts.
* It rejects Stevens's majority opinion (in
the Hanidan decision) that the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 did not retroactively
strip the Supreme Court (and other federal
courts) of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
challenges filed by Guantanamo detainees.
* It rejects the conclusion of four justices in
the liberal wing (in Hamdan) that Al Qaeda
defendants on trial before military
commissions must be allowed to attend their
entire trial and confront all evidence being
used against them-even when the evidence
is classified.
* It rejects the conclusion of the Stevens
plurality in the Hamdan decision that
conspiracy is not a war crime and thus
cannot be the basis of a trial before a
military commission operating under the
Law of War.
* And it rejects the liberal wing's more
expansive view (in Hamdan) of the
applicability of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions to Al Qaeda suspects.
That provision gives a base line of human
rights protections for detainees.
Although Congress and the Bush
administration acknowledge that Common
Article 3 applies in the war on terror, the
Military Commissions Act interprets the
treaty in a way that narrows its protections
and retroactively provides a defense for U.S.
officials who engaged in harsh interrogation
tactics such as simulated drowning and
induced hypothermia.
Human rights workers say such harsh tactics
violate the treaty. Administration officials
deny that U.S. personnel have engaged in
torture or unlawfully cruel conduct during
interrogations.
What a New Case Could
Revolve Around
Ultimately. if the Military Commissions Act
winds up before the high court, the outcome
may turn on how Kennedy interprets a
single paragraph in the 2004 Hamdi
decision. At issue in that case was whether a
U.S. citizen could be held indefinitely as an
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enemy combatant. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor (who has since retired) wrote a
plurality opinion joined by Kennedy. It said
that a citizen-detainee accused of being an
enemy combatant must be able to examine
the factual basis for his detention and be
given a fair opportunity to rebut the
government's allegations before a neutral
decisionmaker.
Allowing a detainee to file a habeas corpus
petition to a federal judge would satisfy this
standard, the court said. But the Hamdi
opinion continues: "There remains the
possibility that the standards we have
articulated could be met by an appropriately
authorized and properly constituted military
tribunal." The opinion cites Army
Regulation 190-8 as an appropriate
substitute.
In the aftermath of both the Hamdi and
Rasul decisions, the Defense Department
was searching for a way to avoid a flood of
habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of
Guantanamo detainees to federal judges in
Washington. Defense officials relied on that
key paragraph in the Hamdi decision and
created the Combat Status Review Tribunal
system, modeled on Army Regulation 190-
8. It involves three officers who review
evidence supporting a detainee's designation
as an enemy combatant.
The thinking was that if the Supreme Court
endorsed such a system as a constitutional
alternative to habeas corpus review for U.S.
citizens in the Hamdi case, the same system
should provide more than enough due
process to noncitizen enemy combatants
being held at Guantanamo.
If Kennedy agrees with this position, the
Military Commissions Act would probably
survive its most serious legal challenge. But
Kennedy's stance on this issue is unclear.
Lawyers for Guantanamo detainees say that
Combat Status Review Tribunals (CSRT)
fall far short of the fair procedures required
in the Hamdi case. "They are a sham," says
Thomas Wilner, one of the lead
Guantanamo defense lawyers who won the
Rasul case and is continuing to litigate
related issues at the federal appeals court in
Washington. "They did not give what
Hamdi said you have to give-the minimal
basic due process requirement."
The requirement includes that a detainee
receive prior notice of all accusations being
made against him and a fair opportunity to
confront those charges before a neutral
decisionmaker.
When the evidence is classified, a
declassified summary doesn't always
provide enough information to enable a
detainee to defend himself, defense lawyers
say.
In one CSRT hearing, the detainee was
accused of associating with a known Al
Qaeda operative in Bosnia.
"Give me his name," the detainee said.
The tribunal president said he didn't know
the name.
"How can I respond to this?" the detainee
asked.
"Did you know of anybody who was a
member of Al Qaeda?" the tribunal
president asked.
"No, no."
The detainee added, "This is something the
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interrogators told me a long while ago. I
asked the interrogators to tell me who this
person was. . . If you tell me the name, then
I can respond and defend myself against this
accusation."
Defense lawyers say that unlike previous
wars, most of the U.S. detainees at
Guantanamo Bay weren't captured by U.S.
soldiers on a battlefield. Many were "sold"
to the Americans by Pakistanis and Afghans
seeking payment of U.S. bounties for Al
Qaeda members even when their Al Qaeda
involvement was less than clear. Defense
lawyers say this is why there may be a
significant number of innocent detainees
among those being held at Guantanamo.
This is complicated by the widely held
assumption that most bona fide Al Qaeda
members will falsely insist during hearings
that they are innocent goatherders or hapless
students rather than holy warriors.
Key Parts of the Military
Commissions Act
* Establishes special rules for military-
commission trials for Al Qaeda suspects
accused of committing war crimes. The
rules permit the exclusion of a defendant
from his trial if classified evidence is being
presented, and the admission of hearsay and
coerced statements as evidence.
* Authorizes a three-officer military panel to
determine a detainee's status as an enemy
combatant eligible for indefinite detention in
U.S. custody. This is in lieu of the ability to
file a habeas corpus petition challenging the
legality of the detention in federal court.
* Creates a retroactive legal defense for U.S.
personnel who engaged in harsh
interrogation tactics from September 2001 to
December 2005. Also narrows the range of
activities that might constitute a violation of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions outlawing torture and cruel
treatment.
* Expands the definition of an unlawful
enemy combatant to provide that anyone
who offers "material support" to someone
engaged in hostilities against the U.S. can be
held indefinitely in military detention,
regardless of whether he or she actually
engaged in hostilities. Also provides that
only noncitizens held as unlawful enemy
combatants may be tried by a military
commission.
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At 9 p.m. on Sunday, June 3, Judge Peter
Brownback III met with counsel in his
chambers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Brownback, an Army colonel and Vietnam
War veteran, was presiding over the military
commission trial of Omar Ahmed Khadr, a
Canadian accused of murder, attempted
murder, providing material support for
terrorism, conspiracy, and spying-an
impressive rap sheet, considering that Khadr
was 15 years old when he was apprehended
in Afghanistan.
The lawyers who were defending and
prosecuting Khadr thought the judge had
called them in to briefly discuss what would
happen the next morning when Khadr was
scheduled for arraignment. So did
Brownback. But he had a different idea of
what would unfold. "I intend to raise
jurisdiction." he told the stunned lawyers. In
lay language. Brownback was saying he
wasn't sure he was authorized to proceed.
Contrary to press reports, the jurisdiction
issue didn't come entirely out of the blue.
Last year's Military Commissions Act,
passed after the Supreme Court struck down
the Bush administration's previous attempt
at military commissions, gave the Pentagon
authority to try "unlawful enemy
combatants," as designated by Combatant
Status Review Tribunals. But the tribunals.
mostly conducted between 2004 and 2005,
had determined that detainees were "enemy
combatants."
They did not touch on the nature, lawful or
otherwise, of that designation.
The missing word looks like a drafting
oversight: The term "unlawful" appears in
the Bush administration's first proposed
military commissions legislation in 2006,
and nobody, proponent or opponent, called
attention to the discrepancy until military
defense lawyers raised it last month in front
of Navy Capt. Keith Alred. He was
presiding over another commission
proceeding, that of Salim Ahmed Hamdan,
who the government says was Osarna bin
Laden's driver. Since Hamdan, like the other
detainees, had been designated as simply an
"enemy combatant," his attorneys argued
that the commission, limited by the law to
trying "unlawful enemy combatants," could
not proceed.
Khadr's attorneys hadn't raised the
"unlawful" question. But Brownback and
Allred share the same support staff. The
military commissions' chief prosecutor and
chief defense counsel speculate that the staff
alerted Brownback to the issue.
So on Monday morning everybody gathered
in the courtroom for oral arguments. By that
time, the Bush administration had been
trying to complete a detainee trial-any
trial-for nearly three years. Shortly after
11 a.m., Brownback announced a recess.
Fifteen minutes later, apparently having
given the matter quite some thought before
the arguments began, he returned with a 17-
page opinion.
Charges Dismissed.
A few hours later, Allred followed suit on
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Hamdan's case. Charges dismissed.
For want of a single word, the military
commissions might be lost-again. On
Friday, June 8, prosecutors asked the judges
to reconsider their decisions. "If we're
unsuccessful, we'll file an appeal to the
Court of Military Commissions Review, and
whoever loses there will appeal to the D.C.
Circuit, and so we're back into the federal
civilian courts," sighed Air Force Col. Moe
Davis, the commissions' chief prosecutor.
Federal civilian court, of course, is exactly
where opponents of the commissions say the
cases should be. Arguing that the military
commission proceedings are stacked against
defendants, their attorneys tried to persuade
the Supreme Court to stop Hamdan's and
Khadr's trials, but the Court turned them
down in April. "Unless there's a really
cogent reason why these cases could not be
tried in federal District Court . . . that's
where they ought to be tried," said Eugene
Fidell, president of the National Institute of
Military Justice. "The federal District Courts
are the jewel in the crown of our legal
system. Why would you use costume
jewelry when you have the real thing?"
A week later, the news got even worse for
the Bush White House. On June 11, a
divided federal Appeals Court panel of three
judges in the conservative 4th District ruled
against the administration in a separate case
that turned on yet another clause of the
Military Commissions Act, one which
sought to deny habeas corpus rights-the
ability to challenge one's detention in
court-to enemy combatants.
The case doesn't directly affect Guantanamo
detainees: The enemy combatant in
question. Qatari citizen Ali Saleh Kahlah al-
Marri. was a legal resident of the United
States who was arrested in Peoria, Ill.. in
2001. But in rejecting the government's
argument. the court cited not only al-Marri's
rights as a legal resident of the United States
but also his absence from an actual
battlefield. That logic, say human-rights
advocates, could carry over to the cases of
other Guantanamo detainees, many of whom
were not captured in battle, or even accused
of participating in hostilities.
"A significant number of detainees
could be found to be improperly classified
as enemy combatants, but they would need
another route into the courts," said Jennifer
Daskal, U.S. advocacy director for Human
Rights Watch. The Justice Department
immediately announced that it would
petition the ruling to the full Appeals Court,
which has 12 judges serving.
The two Mondays' worth of rulings,
combined with former Secretary of State
Colin Powell's June 10 statement that he
would close Guantanamo immediately, have
supplied ammunition to Democrats who
want to amend the Military Commissions
Act and the legal procedures at the
Guantanamo prison. "I'm pretty sure both
Houses will be voting on habeas issues
before the fall," said Christopher Anders,
senior legislative counsel for the American
Civil Liberties Union.
At least one Guantanamo-related bill is
already slated for the Senate floor in June.
Senate Armed Services Committee
Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., inserted a
provision into the 2008 Defense
Authorization Act that would reform the
military commissions and the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals to bring them in
line with military justice standards. Levin
would give detainees facing tribunals the
right to a lawyer. Under his language, a
military judge, rather than an active-duty
military officer with no legal training, would
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preside; evidence would no longer be
weighted in favor of the government; and
tribunals could designate detainees as
unlawful enemy combatants only if they had
actually engaged in hostilities against the
United States, purposefully and materially
supported those hostilities, or were a
knowing and active participant in an
organization engaged in hostilities.
Many current detainees would not fit that
definition of an unlawful combatant, but a
senior Democratic aide pointed out that
Levin's proposal doesn't actually mandate
anyone's release. The committee marked up
the bill on May 25; it is slated for floor
action later this month. "We assume there
will be amendments," the aide said. "Until
we get there, we don't know how it plays
out."
The defense authorization bill could become
a vehicle for other Guantanamo-related
legislation. Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., and ranking
member Arlen Specter, R-Pa., have co-
sponsored a bill to restore habeas corpus
rights to Guantanamo detainees. The
committee passed the bill on June 7, and a
Democratic aide said that Senate Majority
Leader Hany Reid, D-Nev., has promised
floor time.
Meanwhile, Sens. Dianne Feinstein, D-
Calif., and Tom Harkin, D-Iowa., have
introduced separate bills to close
Guantanamo altogether. Feinstein's bill,
which has four co-sponsors, would force the
president to shutter the prison within a year,
transferring detainees either to their home
countries or to U.S. facilities for prosecution
or, in some cases, continued detention.
Harkin's version would require the president
to release or charge detainees within four to
eight months; those charged would be sent
to Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. Harkin is
currently making a push for co-sponsors,
and he has secured the support of the
ACLU, Amnesty International, Human
Rights First, and Human Rights Watch.
Anders noted that Harkin's bill, which
would close Guantanamo by cutting off its
funds, could easily ride on an appropriations
bill, and he pointed out that the
Appropriations Committee, on which Harkin
serves, has several other members who have
expressed their unease with Guantanamo,
including Leahy, Feinstein, and Specter.
Of course, if any of the Senate bills make it
successfully through Congress, a
presidential veto looms. A straightforward
restoration of habeas rights has the most
support in Congress, but even that idea
doesn't necessarily command two-thirds of
the votes in either chamber. "There's
majority support. but nothing approaching a
veto-proof majority," Anders said. With a
year and a half of the Bush presidency
remaining, everyone can settle in for another
long legal fight.
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The D.C. Circuit Court has put off any
action on an appeal by detainee Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, until after the Supreme
Court decides other Guantanamo prisoners'
cases next Tenn. In a one-paragraph order
issued Tuesday, the Circuit Court, acting on
its own, deferred a petition for initial en
banc review of Hamdan v. Gates (Circuit
docket 07-5042), "pending further order of
the court."
Hamdan has an appeal pending there, along
with his two requests pending at the
Supreme Court seeking review by the
Justices ahead of review in the Circuit Court
(Supreme Court dockets 06-1169, rehearing
request, and 07-15, new petition for review).
Attorneys for Hamdan notified the Supreme
Court on Wednesday of the Circuit Court
deferral in [a] letter, with the Circuit Court
order attached. Hamdan's challenge is based
on arguments that he has a legal right to
challenge the military commission that is
schedule to try him on war crimes charges,
and to pursue that challenge in a habeas case
despite Congress' move to scuttle all
detainee habeas claims.
The Circuit Court told both sides to file
motions to govern further proceedings 30
days after the Supreme Court decides the
cases of Boumediene v. Bush (06-1195) and
Al Odah v. U.S. (06-1196), granted review
by the Justices on June 29.
When the Justice Department on July 20
urged the Supreme Court not to hear
Harmdan's new appeal, it argued that the
Court should await a decision by the D.C.
Circuit in the case pending there. The issues
Hamdan raises both at the Circuit Court and
in the Supreme Court, the government brief
said, "would benefit from the normal
decisional process that a case undergoes
before receiving plenary review by this
Court." In the wake of the Circuit Court's
deferral of the Hamdan appeal there, it
appears that there would be nothing for the
Supreme Court to review until some time
after the Supreme Court decides
Boumediene and Al Odah.
Hamdan's counsel has contended that the
Justices should go ahead and grant review of
his new case, on a schedule parallel to that
being followed in Boumediene and Al Odah.
17





The Senate Judiciary Committee yesterday
approved a bill that would give detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the right to challenge
their detention in U.S. courts, part of a
renewed effort by the Democratic-controlled
Congress to challenge the Bush
administration on its wartime policies.
Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) joined all 10
Democrats on the committee in approving the
Habeas Corpus Restoration Act, which aims
to counteract a law passed hastily in October
that stripped detainees of their ability to bring
their cases to court under the centuries-old
legal principle of habeas corpus.
The Republican majority passed the Military
Commissions Act in October over strong
objections that it was unconstitutional and
that it inappropriately allowed the government
to hold detainees at Guantanamo indefinitely
without court challenge.
The bill will head to the Senate floor as part
of the Defense Authorization Bill. That
legislation also includes measures to
dramatically change military tribunals and
military courts designed to deal with "enemy
combatants" captured in the Bush
administration's anti-terrorism campaign.
Though voting was largely split on partisan
lines, yesterday's passage of the bill is among
the first bold rebukes of the administration's
detention policies by a Congress that vowed
to make changes when elected in November.
Habeas corpus, one of the bedrock elements




feel its suspension was a
toward abridging basic
"We must make clear that our laws do not
permit the government to detain people,
including people on U.S. soil. indefinitely
without court review," said Sen. Russell
Feingold (D-Wis.). "This bill is an important
first step in reasserting the primacy of
American values in our law."
Although there was no debate of the bill
yesterday, many Republican lawmakers have
praised existing law because it provides for
court review of a detainee's enemy combatant
status and because they maintain that foreign
nationals held at Guantanamo should not have
the same rights as U.S. citizens. U.S. officials
have opposed giving habeas corpus rights to
detainees, and the new bills to alter the legal
systems at Guantanamo could meet similar
resistance from the Bush administration.
Democratic efforts gained steam this week
when two U.S. military judges at Guantanamo
threw out charges of war crimes against two
detainees because of the way the Military
Commissions Act is written. They ruled that
the law requires detainees to be "unlawful
enemy combatants" to go to trial. Detainees
there are currently designated "enemy
combatants."
Critics of the law cited the error as evidence
that the legal system is a failure; supporters
called it a technicality.
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"Military Judges Dismiss Charges
for 2 Detainees"
The New York Times
June 5, 2007
William Glaberson
The government's new system for trying
Guantanamo detainees was thrown into
turmoil Monday, when military judges in
separate decisions dismissed war crimes
charges against two of the detainees.
The rulings, the latest legal setbacks for the
government's effort to bring war crimes
charges against detainees, could stall the
military's prosecutions here.
The decisions did not turn on the guilt or
innocence of the detainees, but rather made
essentially the same determination that the
military had not followed procedures to
declare the detainees "unlawful enemy
combatants," which is required for the
military commission to hear the cases.
Pentagon officials described the rulings as
raising technical and semantic issues, and
said that they were considering appeals. If
appeals failed, they said, they could go
through the process of redesignating the
detainees.
But military lawyers said the rulings
exposed a flaw that would affect every other
potential war-crimes case here. And the
rulings brought immediate calls, including
from some on Capitol Hill. for Congress to
re-examine the system it set up last year for
military commission trials and, perhaps, to
consider other changes in the legal treatment
of Guantanamo detainees.
In an interview, Senator Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania, the senior Republican on the
Judiciary Committee, said after the first of
the two rulings Monday that the decision
raised significant issues and could prompt
Congress to re-evaluate the legal rights of
detainees, including Congress's decision last
year to revoke the rights of detainees to file
habeas corpus suits to challenge their
detentions.
"The sense I have is that there's an unease,
an uncomfortable sense about the whole
Guantanamo milieu," Mr. Specter said,
adding, "There's just a sense of too many
shortcuts in the whole process."
Whatever the ultimate legal ramifications of
Monday's rulings, they are another in a
string of unexpected detours in the
government's five-year effort to establish a
special legal system for trying foreign
terrorism suspects. The current commission
system was approved by Congress after the
Supreme Court last June struck down the
administration's first plan for holding war
crimes trials.
The military judges said Congress
authorized the bringing of war-crimes
charges against detainees who had been
declared by military tribunals to be
"unlawful enemy combatants." But they said
the tribunals held at Guantanamo, known as
combatant status review tribunals, or
C.S.R.T.'s. had determined only that the
detainees were enemy combatants. without
making the added determination that their
participation was "unlawful."
The international law of war defines
unlawful combatants as fighters who, for
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example. do not wear military uniforms and
conceal their weapons.
Monday's rulings came in the cases of the
only Canadian detainee, Omar Ahmed
Khadr, and a Yemeni detainee, Salim
Ahmed Hamdan. Mr. Hamdan's appeal of a
prior effort to prosecute him led to a
Supreme Court decision last June in which
the justices struck down the administration's
first system for war-crimes trials.
The military judge in Mr. Hamdan's case,
Capt. Keith Allred of the Navy, said the
Pentagon had failed to obtain the necessary
enemy combatant classification of Mr.
Hamdan, who is accused of being the [al]
Qaeda driver for Osama bin Laden.
Mr. Hamdan's longtime military lawyer, Lt.
Cmdr. Charles Swift said that, though his
client was unlikely to obtain freedom
because of the decision, "It was once again a
victory for the rule of law."
The judge in Mr. Khadr's case, Peter E.
Brownback III, an Army colonel. said since
the detainee had not been declared an
unlawful enemy combatant, the military
court did not have jurisdiction over the case
and the proceedings could not continue. "A
person has a right to be tried only by a court
which he knows has jurisdiction over him."
Judge Brownback said from the bench in the
military courtroom here.
Mr. Khadr, who was 15 when he was
captured in Afghanistan, is charged with
killing an American soldier. spying,
supporting terrorism and other charges.
The White House declined on Monday night
to comment on the decisions. Beth G.
Kubala, an Army major who is the
spokeswoman for the Office of Military
Commissions at the Pentagon, said that the
day's ruling demonstrated that the military
judges operated independently. But she
suggested that the military did not view the
double defeat as paralyzing to its
prosecutions of war crimes.
"The public should make no assumptions,"
Ms. Kubala said, "about the future of
military commissions."
A Pentagon statement said: "We believe that
Congress intended to grant jurisdiction
under the Military Commissions Act to
individuals, like Mr. Khadr, who are being
held as enemy combatants under existing
C.S.R.T. procedures."
But Mr. Specter said it was "dead wrong" to
assert that Congress intended to permit
prosecution of detainees who had not been
declared unlawful enemy combatants.
So far, three detainees have been charged
with war crimes under the law passed last
year, including Mr. Khadr and Mr. Hamdan.
The third detainee, David Hicks, pleaded
guilty earlier this year and was sent to his
native Australia. Prosecutors have said they
may file such war crimes charges against
about 80 of the 380 detainees here.
Under directives from President Bush and
senior Defense Department officials,
military officials here have held detainees
after finding simply that they were "enemy
combatants."
Those procedures have long drawn criticism,
with some opponents of administration
policies saying they appeared to ignore
principles of the international law of war,
which sanctions the violence of battle
without classifying it as a war crime.
The military could repair the problem raised
by the judges Monday by holding new
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combatant status review hearings to
determine if each of the detainees slated for
war-crimes charges was an unlawful
combatant.
But the chief military defense lawyer here,
Col. Dwight Sullivan of the Marines, said he
viewed the decision as having broad impact
because it underscored what he and other
critics have described as a commission
process that lacks international legitimacy
and legal authority.
"How much more evidence do we need that
the military commission process doesn't
work?" asked Colonel Sullivan.
Some experts on military law said the new
tangle of legal challenges would almost
certainly cause extensive delays at a time
when the administration has been pressing to
show that its legal proceedings at
Guantanamo were moving forward.
David W. Glazier, a retired Navy
commander who is an associate professor at
the Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, said
it would be cumbersome for the military to
get new determinations that the detainees
were unlawful combatants.
"All the individuals that the government
wants to charge will have to go through the
C.S.R.T. process again," Mr. Glazier said.
Some legal experts said subjecting the
detainees to new combatant status hearings
could create additional problems for the
administration. The combatant status panels
have been among the most criticized
features of the Pentagon's legal system here,
in part because detainees are not permitted
lawyers and are not allowed to see much of
the evidence against them.
In a recent case in federal appeals court in
Washington, the Justice Department
acknowledged that in some cases, Pentagon
officials disagreed with findings from
combatant status panels that detainees were
not enemy combatants. In some of those
cases new hearings were ordered and those









A federal appeals court ruled yesterday that
President Bush cannot indefinitely imprison
a U.S. resident on suspicion alone, ordering
the government either to charge Qatari
national Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri with his
alleged terrorist crimes in a civilian court or
release him.
The opinion is a blow to the Bush
administration's assertion that the president
has exceptionally broad powers to combat
terrorism, including the authority to detain
without charges foreign citizens living
legally in the United States.
It is the first time a court has said that Mari
cannot be held forever without facing formal
charges, but it is a symbolic victory-Marri
will continue his detention in a naval brig in
Charleston, S.C. The government said that it
was disappointed by the 2 to 1 decision,
handed down by a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 4th Circuit, and that it will
appeal to the full court.
The appeals panel ruled that Bush had
overreached his authority and that the
Constitution protects U.S. citizens and legal
residents such as Marri from unchecked
military power. It also rejected the
administration's contention that it was not
relevant that Marri was arrested in the
United States and was living here legally on
a student visa.
"The President cannot eliminate
constitutional protections with the stroke of
a pen by proclaiming a civilian, even a
criminal civilian, an enemy combatant
subject to indefinite military detention," the
panel found.
Justice Department spokesman Dean Boyd
said that Marri posed a significant threat,
and that imprisoning enemy fighters is
necessary to stop future attacks.
"The president has made clear that he
intends to use all available tools at his
disposal to protect Americans from further
al-Qaeda attack, including the capture and
detention of al-Qaeda agents who enter our
borders," Boyd said.
U.S. District Judge Henry E. Hudson, a
Bush appointee, dissented from the opinion.
Hudson contended that Bush had the power
to detain enemy combatants under
Congress's authorization to use military
force.
"Although al-Marri was not personally
engaged in armed conflict with U.S. forces,
he is the type of stealth warrior used by al
Qaeda to perpetrate terrorist acts against the
United States," Hudson wrote. "There is
little doubt," the judge maintained, that al-
Marri was in the country to aid in hostile
attacks on the United States.
Marri's case is one of several involving the
rights of suspected enemy combatants that
have reached the appellate level of the
federal courts and are likely to be decided by
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the Supreme Court.
Marri was a university student in Peoria, Ill.,
when he was arrested in December 2001 as a
"material witness." The government said
that Marri-who was identified as part of an
al-Qaeda sleeper cell by Khalid Sheik
Mohammed, architect of the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks-came to the United States to
prepare for a second wave of terrorist
strikes. Marri was initially held in prisons in
Illinois and New York, then was deemed an
enemy combatant by Bush and transferred to
the brig, where he has been held for the past
four years.
Marri is the last of three U.S. citizens or
residents in the Charleston brig. Yaser Esam
Hamdi, a U.S. citizen captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan, was held for
almost three years by the military without
charges. He was released and sent to his
native Saudi Arabia after the Supreme Court
ruled in 2004 that U.S. citizens must be
afforded court trials.
Jose Padilla, another U.S. citizen. was
originally accused by the government of
attempting to explode a radiological "dirty
bomb" in the United States. He was released
before a Supreme Court hearing on the case.
The government filed less-serious criminal
charges against him in November 2005 and
transferred him to a civilian prison in Miami
in January 2006. He is currently on trial.
The 4th Circuit, based in Richmond., is
considered one of the most conservative in
the country, but the three-judge panel that
heard the case was not. Two judges known
as moderates, both appointed by President
Bill Clinton, made up the majority in the
decision.
The panel found that the 2006 Military
Commissions Act, which prohibits enemy
combatants from challenging the basis for
their imprisonment in U.S. courts, does not
apply to a person living legally in the United
States. The judges also doubted the legality
of classifying someone as an enemy
combatant who was not caught on the
battlefield or was not carrying arms.
Civil libertarians who championed Marri's
case had warned that if the administration
prevailed in its argument, the military could
next round up U.S. citizens and jail them
without trial. The court appeared to agree.
"To sanction such presidential authority to
order the military to seize and indefinitely
detain civilians . . . would have disastrous
consequences for the constitution-and the
country." U.S. Circuit Judge Diana Gribbon
Motz wrote for the majority
The panel tailored its opinion to Marri's
circumstances; it does not directly apply to
the more than 300 foreign nationals held as
enemy combatants in the military prison at
Guantanamo Bay. Cuba. But lawyers for
some captives noted that the same flaws the
court found in the administration s
classification of Marri were true for
Guantanamo detainees.
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"Government Calls Al-Marri Ruling




The Justice Department, denouncing as
"radical" a Fourth Circuit Court ruling
rejecting presidential authority to seize and
detain a civilian captured inside the U.S.,
asked the Circuit Court on Wednesday to
rehear the case en banc, and to overturn it
swiftly. . . . It said that the decision "poses
an immediate and potentially grave threat to
national security."
The case appears ultimately headed for the
Supreme Court, whatever the Fourth Circuit
does with it now.
Describing Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri as
"an Al Qaeda fighter" who entered the U.S.
the day before Sept. 11, 2001. "to act as a
'sleeper agent' with the intent to commit
war-like acts," the petition argued that the
panel ruling on June 11 "warrants swift
reconsideration and repudiation." Much of
the government's description of his
background appears to have come from
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the captured
"mastermind" of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The panel decision "radically circumscribes
the President's authority to wage the
ongoing military conflict against Al Qaeda
and impairs his ability to protect the Nation
from further Al Qaeda attack at home,"
according to the document filed by U.S.
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement.
In the 2-1 ruling, the panel barred military
detention of any civilian captured inside the
U.S., but the decision was explicitly limited
to those who are in the country legally and
have established connections here. Al-Marri,
a Qatar national, was arrested at his home in
Peoria, Ill., where he was attending Bradley
University. The government was ordered to
release him from military custody, but the
Court also said he could be transferred to
civilian authority to face criminal charges,
subjected to deportation procedures, held as
a witness for a grand jury investigation, or
held for a limited period of time under the
Patriot Act.
The panel majority also ruled that Congress
has not taken away the legal rights of Al-
Marri to challenge his detention, thus
limiting the reach of the Military
Commissions Act's court-stripping
provisions. It found he had a right of habeas
corpus protected by the Constitution.
Al-Marri's lawyers can reply to the
government's rehearing request only if the
Circuit Court asks them to do so. It will take
the votes of a majority of the Court's 12
active judges to grant review before the full
bench.
The case, the government's petition said,
''raises questions of exceptional importance
concerning the authority of the President to
detain alien enemy combatants in the
ongoing conflict with Al Qaeda."
"The panel majority's construction of the
[9/11 Resolution] leads to the absurd
conclusion that when Congress authorized
the use of military force to respond to the
September 11 attacks, it did not intend to
reach individuals identically situated to the
September 11 hijackers, none of whom had
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engaged in combat operations against our
forces on a foreign battlefield," the petition
declared.
At the conclusion of the petition, the Justice
Department briefly argued that the Circuit
Court had no jurisdiction over the case
because of the court-stripping provisions of
the MCA passed by Congress last October.
"The scope of the MCA is an important
question in its own right," the Department
said. It urged the full Court to vacate the
panel ruling, rehear the case then send it
back to the District Court for dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction.
The government petition put heavy stress on
identifying Al-Marri with the "Al Qaeda
agents who waged the deadly September 11
attacks." It said that he was "identically
situated" to those "Al Qaeda fighters," and
yet the Circuit Court decision
".paradoxically" interprets the government's
authority to seize terrorists as applying to
any suspected '"enemy combatant" except
those agents.
Al-Marri was seized in Peoria in December
2001. He was not turned over to the military
until June 2003. when President Bush
designated him an "enemy combatant." He
has been held since then at the U.S. Navy
brig in Charleston, S.C. He has been seeking
his release in a habeas challenge since July
2004.
Military detention of Al-Marri was defended
by the Justice Department filing on the basis
of the 9/11 Resolution that Congress passed
after the 2001 terrorist attacks, and on the
president's "inherent authority" under the
Constitution's Article II to "detain enemy
combatants in the context of an armed
conflict." It also contended that, because
Congress had passed the Resolution
supporting a presidential response to the
Sept. 11 attacks, "the President was acting at
the zenith of his powers" under the Supreme
Court's decision in 1952 in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer.
The petition asserted that the Supreme Court
and the Fourth Circuit Court already have
upheld presidential authority to seize and
detain even U.S. citizens who are suspected
of terrorism, and thus the panel decision in
Al-Mani's case directly conflicts with those
rulings in barring the military detention of a
non-citizen. The Supreme Court decision it
cited was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in 2004, and
the Fourth Circuit ruling was Padilla v.
Hanft in 2005. "The panel decision in this
case cannot be reconciled with Hamdi and
Padilla," the petition said.
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"Impunity for al-Qaeda: The Implications of a Bad
Ruling on 'Unlawful Enemy Combatants"'
The Washington Post
July 2, 2007
David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey
The federal appeals court in Richmond
should quickly grant the Justice
Department's request that it reconsider last
month's decision in the case of Al-Marri v.
Wright-a decision that denied the existence
of the legal category "unlawful enemy
combatant" in America's conflict with al-
Qaeda. (This question is not, it should be
noted, at issue in the Guantanamo detainee
cases that the Supreme Court has just agreed
to hear in the fall.)
The reasoning in the Al-Marri case was
deeply flawed, and if widely adopted it
would undermine a fundamental purpose of
the laws of war: avoiding impunity for war
crimes. The ruling not only weakened
America's national security but opened the
possibility that no body of law applies to
conflicts between non-state actors-which
would make it impossible, for example, to
prosecute the Hamas gunmen who recently
murdered Fatah fighters and wantonly killed
Palestinian civilians in Gaza.
The case involved the detention of Ali Saleh
Kahlah al-Marri, a man the United States
believes to be an al-Qaeda agent and has
held since 2003 as an enemy combatant.
Two of three 4th Circuit judges concluded
that because al-Qaeda is not a state, Mari
must be treated as a civilian criminal
defendant. They claimed this position was
supported by the Supreme Court's statement
in Hanidan v. Rumsfeld that the war in
Afghanistan is only an internal conflict-
and further claimed that the legal
classification of enemy combatant, as
opposed to civilian, does
conflicts.
not exist in such
Their sole authority for this conclusion was
a 2005 statement by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). a
persistent critic of America's war on terror,
that "[i]n non-international armed conflict
combatant status does not exist." Ironically,
for years the ICRC tried to achieve some
type of combatant status for non-state
participants in internal conflicts, fearing that
most countries would treat them far more
harshly as civilian criminal defendants.
Moreover, its 2005 assertion that combatant
status does not exist in internal conflicts-
especially as construed in Al-Marri-is
inconsistent with its own earlier (and more
authoritative) commentary on the Geneva
Conventions.
In 1960 the ICRC addressed Geneva's
"Common Article 3" on internal armed
conflicts and acknowledged that "the
conflicts referred to in Article 3 are
[generally] armed conflicts, with aimed
forces on either side engaged in hostilities-
conflicts, in short, which are in many
respects similar to an international war, but
take place within the confines of a single
country." "Armed forces" and "hostilities"
are legal terms that imply-indeed.
require-recognition that the category of
enemy combatant exists in internal armed
conflicts.
The court made an equally serious error in
suggesting that the United States can be at
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war with al-Qaeda only when that group is
affiliated with a foreign government.
Although nations rarely invoke the laws of
war with regard to non-state actors, the legal
basis of such conflicts is well established.
The Supreme Court has held that the United
States could be at "war" with non-state
entities such as Indian tribes. It also
recognized during the Civil War-another
conflict between the United States and a
non-state-that whether the United States is
at war, and with whom, is a question
reserved to the political branches, in
particular to the president. Under the Al-
Marri reasoning, everyone fighting for the
South during the Civil War was a civilian
because none was "affiliated with
recognized nation states."
To distinguish Al-Marri from its earlier
decision involving alleged al-Qaeda
operative Jose Padilla, who was an enemy
combatant, the court asserted that Padilla
fought alongside the Taliban-and
characterized the Taliban as the "de facto"
government of Afghanistan. This is a type of
diplomatic recognition that the United States
(and the international community generally)
denied to that barbaric militia. The
Constitution, of course, gives the president
the right to grant or withhold such
recognition. More important, under the 4th
Circuit's rationale, the United States is not
now engaged in a legally cognizable armed
conflict with al-Qaeda-with its Taliban
patrons on the run, al-Qaeda has no
governmental affiliation, except the self-
styled "Islamic State of Iraq."
The implications are profound. Application
of the laws of war governs the detention of
enemy combatants but also creates the legal
justification for the initial use of armed
force. Only if the laws of war apply can the
United States lawfully take the offensive
against al-Qaeda, seeking out and attacking
with deadly force its operatives in
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Congress's
post-Sept..11 authorization for the use of
military force properly invoked this legal
regime. Moreover, if the laws of war do not
apply to conflicts involving non-state actors,
there is no legal regime governing conflicts
between groups in areas-such as Gaza-
where there is no recognized state authority.
This is true impunity.
By substituting its will for that of Congress
and the president, the court's decision would
strip the initiative from U.S. forces and
transform the war on teror into a reactive
policing function-exactly the posture
America was in on the morning of Sept. 11,
2001. As Justice Robert Jackson wrote long
ago, for all its obvious virtues the
Constitution is not a suicide pact. The court
should quickly overturn this decision so that
Jackson's words will continue to be true.
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The indignance emanating from the right
wing over the Al-Marri decision is over the
court's labeling Ali Al-Marri, an alleged al-
Qaida operative, as a civilian rather than an
enemy combatant.
"By (the court's) lights, even 9/11 ringleader
Mohamed Atta wasn't a combatant. Despite
his enlistment in an organization waging war
on America that had trained him and sent
him here, he was just a civilian," wrote the
National Review in an editorial blasting the
4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruling.
What seems to be getting their camouflage-
colored boxers in a knot is the nomenclature.
The term civilian seems to imply moral
innocence while "enemy combatant" is
freighted with aggressive action and evil
intent. This is an improper reading of these
terms.
The case of Al-Marri involves a national of
Qatar who was a legal U.S. resident
studying at Bradley University in Peoria,
Ill., and living with his wife and five
children before being imprisoned without
charge in a 9-by-6-foot cell.
Al-Marri was detained in 2001 and
eventually charged with a series of crimes
involving fraudulent credit cards. Then, in
June 2003, he was unilaterally designated an
enemy combatant by the president and
spirited to a military brig in South Carolina,
where he was held in solitary confinement
for the next four years. The military says Al-
Marri was serving as a "sleeper agent" in the
United States and was on a mission to
disrupt the country s financial system
through computer hacking. It says that
because of these suspicions, it can hold him
indefinitely without charge.
In ringing language, the court refused to go
along: "The president cannot eliminate
constitutional protections with the stroke of
a pen by proclaiming a civilian, even a
criminal civilian, an enemy combatant
subject to indefinite military detention." Al-
Mari is not fighting for a nation with which
we are at war and therefore he must be tried
as a civilian in accordance with the due
process guarantees of the Constitution, the
court said.
Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, the opinion's
author, goes out of her way to recognize the
"grave threat international terrorism poses to
our country and our national security," and
the potential harm Al-Marri may pose.
But she clearly draws a line between war
and everything else.
A civilian can be guilty of horrendous
crimes against our nation. The court pointed
to the Unabomber and the conspirators in
the Oklahoma City bombing. In those cases,
terrorism was the goal and the crimes were
motivated by a warped ideology. Add to that
any number of Islamic terrorist cases that
have already been successfully prosecuted-
including Zacarias Moussaoui. convicted as
part of the 9/11 conspiracy. and the men
who participated in the first World Trade
Center bombing-and it is clear that the
term civilian has nothing whatever to do
with guilt or innocence. It is also apparent
that the criminal justice system is perfectly
28
capable of dealing with monsters, even those
who are well-organized and supremely
armed.
Meanwhile, the term "enemy combatant" is
what, under the law of war, the enemy
soldier is called-the Japanese, German,
Korean and Vietnamese soldiers we
captured during wartime. Enemy combatants
can fight us with lethal force, be captured,
and then released at the end of hostilities.
Eric Freedman, a law professor at Hofstra
University, made this distinction clear in the
New York Times when he said it makes no
sense to say we are at war with a group of
terrorists.
"The Colombian drug cartel has airplanes
and bombs and boats, and it shoots down
American airplanes," Freedman said.
"They're criminals." Otherwise, Freedman
said, "They'd have combat immunity."
What President Bush has been pushing for is
a rubric that does not follow the law of war
or the civilian system. He has been blazing a
new path for America. One of presidential
tyranny, where the commander in chief has
dominion over the battlefield, defined as the
entire planet, and may designate anyone an
enemy to be thrown into detention, tortured
into talking and never heard from again. The
prisoners wouldn't be soldiers in war or
civilians. They would be America's
disappeared.
If the court approved what happened to Al-
Marri, there would be no legal principle that
prevented the president from doing the same
to any American.
The Al-Marri ruling noted that Congress, in
passing the Patriot Act, outlined provisions
for suspected alien terrorists. They could be
held for seven days before charges had to be
filed or deportation commenced. In
disregarding Congress' rather generous
grant of executive power, Bush has said that
charges don't have to be brought at all.
Unchecked executive detention is not a new
response to a new kind of threat. It is a very
old response used historically by kings,
dictators and despots, and its acceptance
here would change everything.
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A sharply divided federal appeals court in
Cincinnati handed the Bush administration's
warrantless surveillance program a major
legal victory Friday, ruling that the American
Civil Liberties Union and several other
plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge
the program.
The 2-1 decision by the 6th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals sent the case back to a federal trial
judge in Detroit and ordered her to dismiss
the case, reversing a ruling the judge had
issued last year that the program was
unconstitutional.
Justice Department lawyers had urged the
panel to throw out the case, saying that a full-
fledged review of the government initiative
launched after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks
would violate the "state secrets" doctrine.
Established in 1953, it bars the discovery or
admission of evidence that would expose
information that the government maintains
would harm national security.
At oral arguments in late January, Justice
Department lawyer Gregory Garre argued that
without such privileged information, none of
the plaintiffs could establish standing to sue.
U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor had
rejected the argument. saying that three
publicly acknowledged facts about the
government's surveillance program were
sufficient to establish standing.
Taylor noted that the government had
acknowledged. after the program was
disclosed in a New York Times article in 2005,
that it was eavesdropping on international
telephone and e-mail communications in
which at least one of the parties was
suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda and that
the surveillance was being conducted without
warrants.
Taylor also ruled that the 4th Amendment
prohibition against illegal searches and
seizures was an absolute rule that required the
government to obtain a warrant before
conducting such surveillance.
But the 6th Circuit Court ruled that the
plaintiffs had failed to show that they had
been individually injured by the program. and
therefore did not have standing to challenge
the program in court.
Judge Alice Batchelder said the plaintiffs,
who also included several lawyers and
writers, could not "produce any evidence that
any of their own communications have ever
been intercepted" by the National Security
Agency under the surveillance program.
Rather. Batchelder said, the plaintiffs had
asserted "a mere belief' that their overseas
contacts were the types of people being
targeted by the NSA and consequently they
had been subjected to illegal eavesdropping.
and that the surveillance had led the NSA to
discover and possibly disclose privileged
information.
Justice Department lawyers also argued that
the program was legal. They contended that
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when Congress authorized the use of military
force after Sept. 11. it clearly contemplated
that the president could conduct
counterintelligence surveillance of the type
used in the NSA program.
Garre asserted at the Jan. 31 oral argument in
the 6th Circuit Court that it would be
unprecedented for a U.S. court to say that a
president did not have such power.
The plaintiffs said they had been injured by
the surveillance program in three ways. They
said it had hampered their ability to
communicate with their overseas contacts
because of their fear that the illegal
surveillance might harm such contacts. The
plaintiffs, particularly lawyers, said that made
communicating with clients overseas more
burdensome and costly, requiring them to
travel overseas to meet with their contacts or
to refrain from talking to them at all.
The plaintiffs also said the program had a
"chilling effect" on their overseas contacts'
willingness to talk to them.
And the plaintiffs asserted that the NSA had
directly invaded their privacy.
But Batchelder, joined by Judge Julia
Gibbons, said the plaintiffs conceded that "no
single plaintiff can show [that he or she had
been wiretapped]."
"Moreover, due to the State Secrets Doctrine,
the proof needed ... to make such a showing
is privileged," and therefore unavailable to the
plaintiffs, Batchelder wNTote.
The majority also rejected the plaintiffs'
claims that their 1st Amendment rights had
been violated. Judge Ronald Gilman
dissented.
In a concurrng opinion, Gibbons said the
plaintiffs "can show nothing more than a fear
[of] being subject to a government policy of
surveillance." But Gilman's dissent said that
the attorney plaintiffs in the case had
"articulated an actual or imminent harm"
flowing from the surveillance program. The
program, Gilman wrote, "forces them to
decide between breaching their duty of
confidentiality to their clients and breaching
their duty to provide zealous representation.
Neither position is tenable."
ACLU legal director Steven Shapiro said the
organization was "deeply disappointed by
[Friday's] decision that insulates the Bush
administration's warrantless surveillance
activities from judicial review and deprives
Americans of any ability to challenge the
illegal surveillance of their telephone calls
and e-mails. . . . The Bush administration has
been left free to violate the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, which Congress
adopted almost 30 years ago to prevent the
executive branch from engaging in precisely
this kind of unchecked surveillance."
Brian Roehrkasse, a Justice Department
spokesman, said the department was pleased
with the ruling, "which confirms that
plaintiffs in this case cannot seek to expose
sensitive details about the classified and
important" surveillance program.
The White House also applauded the ruling.
saying the administration had believed all
along that Judge Taylor in Detroit had
wrongly decided the case."
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, said he was troubled by
the ruling.
"The court's decision is a disappointing one
that was not made on the merits of the case,
yet closed the courthouse doors to resolving
it," he said. "I hope the Bush administration
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will finally provide the information requested
by Congress regarding the constitutional and
legal questions about this program so that
those of us who represent the American
people can get to the bottom of what
happened and why."
Several other cases challenging the program
are pending in federal court in San Francisco.
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A Senate committee investigating the Bush
administration's domestic wiretapping
program subpoenaed the White House, Vice
President Dick Cheney's office and the
Justice Department on Wednesday for
information regarding their legal justification
for the warrantless secret surveillance.
The subpoenas by the Judiciary Committee
set the stage for another legal and political
battle between Senate Democrats and the
Bush administration over its counterterrorism
and law enforcement policies. Earlier
subpoenas issued by Democratic lawmakers
to current and former White House officials
have essentially been ignored.
Legal experts suggested Wednesday that the
administration would fight or ignore these
subpoenas, too, throwing the issue into
federal court, perhaps even the Supreme
Court. The ultimate outcome, they said, could
be an out-of-court compromise that gives
lawmakers at least some insight into the legal
machinations surrounding the top-secret
National Security Agency program.
President Bush authorized the domestic
surveillance program soon after the Sept. 11.
2001, terrorist attacks, allowing the NSA to
monitor international phone calls and e-mails
to or from the United States involving people
that authorities suspected of having links to
terrorists.
In letters accompanying the subpoenas,
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen. Patrick
Leahy (D-Vt.) said the panel had made at
least nine formal requests for such
documentation from the White House and the
Justice Department, but all were rebuffed.
Moreover, Leahy said in the letters that
attempts to get senior administration officials
to testify before Congress on the legality of
wiretapping "have been met with a consistent
pattern of evasion and misdirection."
Leahy noted that the Judiciary Committee
was not seeking operational details of the
program, which remains highly classified. But
he said the committee was charged with
oversight of the executive branch in the areas
of constitutional protections and the civil
liberties of Americans.
"The warrantless electronic surveillance
program directly impacts those
responsibilities," Leahy wrote. "We cannot
conduct this oversight without knowing the
legal arguments the Administration has used
to justify interception of the communications
of Americans without a warrant."
Leahy said he was issuing the subpoenas in
consultation with the ranking Republican on
the panel, Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania.
Two other senior Republicans on the
committee, former chairman Orrin G. Hatch
of Utah and Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, also
voted with Democrats last week to give Leahy
the power to issue the subpoenas.
Leahy gave those receiving the subpoenas
until July 18 to comply.
White House spokesman Tony Fratto
condemned the subpoenas as an act of
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political partisanship, and did not say whether
the administration would comply with them.
"We're aware of the committee's action and
will respond appropriately," Fratto said. "It's
unfortunate that congressional Democrats
continue to choose the route of
confrontation."
Fratto said the so-called terrorist surveillance
program is "lawful, limited, safeguarded
and-most importantly-effective in
protecting American citizens from terrorist
attacks. It's specifically designed to be
effective without infringing Americans' civil
liberties."
After the existence of the surveillance
program was disclosed in December 2005,
Bush defended it as necessary to fight a
shadowy terrorist enemy with expertise in
shrouding its plotting and communications in
secrecy. Bush also said the program was
legal, approved by at least some members of
Congress, and that he had authority to
authorize the eavesdropping as commander-
in-chief, using expanded war powers granted
to him by Congress.
The White House initially claimed that the
program did not require court approval, but
was challenged in court. The administration
agreed earlier this year to allow it to be
reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance court.
The president still claims the power to order
warrantless spying.
A Judiciary Committee staffer said the
senators want documents that could shed light
on internal deliberations and disputes within
the administration over the legality of the
program, including who in the Justice
Department expressed concerns about it, and
when.
Former Deputy Atty. Gen. James Comey
testified last month before the committee that
he, former Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft and FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller III threatened to
resign after the White House tried to override
their objections to the program in 2004.
Comey said that effort included a nighttime
visit by the current attorney general, Alberto
R. Gonzales, who was then White House
counsel, and Andrew H. Card Jr., then the
White House chief of staff, to the hospital bed
of an ailing Ashcroft, to get him to reverse
course and recertify the program.
Ashcroft refused and Bush ultimately made
changes to the program that the senior Justice
Department officials demanded.
No one involved has commented publicly on
what those changes were or what kind of
domestic spying had been going on
previously.
"After we learned from Jim Comey about the
late-night hospital visit to John Ashcroft's
bedside, it was even more imperative that we
find out the who, what, how and why
surrounding the wiretapping of Americans
without warrants," another Judiciary
Committee member, Sen. Charles E. Schumer
(D-N.Y.), said Wednesday.
The subpoenas also seek information about
the apparent shutdown of an investigation into
the eavesdropping by the Justice
Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility.
"This bumps up the stakes by threatening a
court showdown," said Richard Ben-Veniste,
a former Watergate prosecutor who also
served on the commission that investigated
the Sept. 11 attacks.
Ben-Veniste said such a court battle could be
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drawn out, and that "perhaps the intention of
the White House is to run the clock on the
remainder of this administration's term in
office."
But, he added, "I think there is a strong
likelihood that eventually a compromise will
be worked out which affords some review by
the judiciary."
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"Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping
in Terror Cases"
The New York Times
January 18, 2007
Eric Lichtblau and David Johnston
The Bush administration, in a surprise
reversal, said on Wednesday that it had
agreed to give a secret court jurisdiction
over the National Security Agency's
wiretapping program and would end its
practice of eavesdropping without warrants
on Americans suspected of ties to terrorists.
The Justice Department said it had worked
out an "innovative" arrangement with the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that
provided the "necessary speed and agility"
to provide court approval to monitor
international communications of people
inside the United States without
jeopardizing national security.
The decision capped 13 months of bruising
national debate over the reach of the
president's wartime authorities and his
claims of executive power, and it came as
the administration faced legal and political
hurdles in its effort to continue the
surveillance program.
The new Democratic-led Congress has
pledged several investigations. More
immediately, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales is expected to face hostile
questioning on Thursday from the Senate
Judiciary Committee on the program. And
an appellate court in Cincinnati is scheduled
to hear arguments in two weeks on the
government's appeal of an earlier ruling
declaring the program illegal and
unconstitutional.
Some legal analysts said the
administration's pre-emptive move could
effectively make the court review moot, but
Democrats and civil rights advocates said
they would press for the courts and
Congress to continue their scrutiny of the
program of wiretapping without warrants,
which began shortly after the terrorist
attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
Democrats praised the administration's
decision, but said it should have come much
sooner.
"The announcement today is welcome
news," said Senator John D. Rockefeller IV,
the West Virginia Democrat who leads the
Intelligence Committee. "But it is also
confirmation that the administration's go-it-
alone approach, effectively excluding
Congress and the courts and operating
outside the law, was unnecessary."
Mr. Rockefeller added, "I intend to move
forward with the committee's review of all
aspects of this program's legality and
effectiveness."
Since the surveillance program was publicly
disclosed in December 2005 by The New
York Times, the White House has
maintained, in scores of court filings, policy
papers and press statements, that the
president has the inherent power to conduct
wiretaps without a court warrant even
though a 1978 law put intelligence
surveillance under judicial review. The
administration failed to win Congressional
approval for the program last year after
months of lobbying, and some Democrats
are still trying to ban it outright.
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The administration continued to assert on
Wednesday that the N.S.A. program had
operated legally, but it also said the time had
come to allow the intelligence surveillance
court, known as the FISA court, to review
all warrants on all wiretaps in terrorism
investigations.
"There's obviously an advantage to having
all three branches involved," said a senior
Justice Department official, who briefed
reporters on the decision on condition of
anonymity. "This issue of the terrorist
surveillance program is one that has been
under intense public debate and scrutiny on
the Hill, and just considering all these
circumstances, the president determined that
this is the appropriate course."
President Bush has authorized the
continuation of the N.S.A. program every 45
days by executive order to allow the N.S.A.
to conduct wiretaps on international
communications without a court warrant.
When the current order expires, however,
President Bush has decided not to
reauthorize the program, officials said.
The Justice Department said Wednesday
that it had obtained multiple orders, or
warrants, a week ago from the FISA court
allowing it to monitor international
communications in cases where there was
probable cause to believe one of the
participants was linked to Al Qaeda or an
affiliated terrorist group.
"As a result of these orders," Mr. Gonzales
told leaders of Congressional Intelligence
and Judiciary Committees in a letter dated
Wednesday, "any electronic surveillance
that was occurring as part of the Terrorist
Surveillance Program will now be
conducted subject to the approval of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court."
Justice Department officials said that the
FISA court orders, which were not made
public, were not a broad approval of the
surveillance program as a whole, an idea
that was proposed last year in Congressional
debate over the program. They strongly
suggested that the orders secured from the
court were for individual targets, but they
refused to provide details of the process
used to identify targets-or how court
approval had been expedited-because they
said it remained classified. The senior
Justice Department official said that
discussing "the mechanics of the orders"
could compromise intelligence activities.
Justice Department officials would not
describe whether the court had agreed to
new procedures to streamline the process of
issuing orders or accepted new standards to
make it easier for the government to get
approval to monitor suspect e-mail and
phone communications.
But the officials suggested that the effort to
obtain the court's approval for orders on Jan.
10 was not easy. "These aren't some sort of
advisory rulings," one official said. "These
are orders issued by the FISA court, not
some cookie-cutter order. These orders are
complex. It took a long time to work on
this."
The officials said the new approach was
based on evolving legal interpretations of
the foreign surveillance law by the Justice
Department, changes in the foreign
surveillance statute in recent years and
precedents set by the FISA court in
approving specific requests to conduct
electronic monitoring.
The N.S.A., which has run the program of
surveillance without warrants since Mr.
Bush secretly approved it in October 2001,
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is known to have used broad pattern analysis
in tracking terrorist communications and
identifying possible terrorists.
But senior lawmakers said they were still
uncertain Wednesday, even after the
administration's announcement, about how
the court would go about approving
warrants, how targets would be identified,
and whether that process would differ from
the court's practices since 1978.
The administration said it had briefed the
full House and Senate Intelligence
Committees in closed sessions on its
decision.
But Representative Heather A. Wilson,
Republican of New Mexico, who serves on
the Intelligence committee, disputed that,
and some Congressional aides said staff
members were briefed Friday without
lawmakers present.
Ms. Wilson, who has scrutinized the
program for the last year, said she believed
the new approach relied on a blanket,
"programmatic" approval of the president's
surveillance program, rather than approval
of individual warrants.
Administration officials "have convinced a
single judge in a secret session, in a
nonadversarial session, to issue a court order
to cover the president's terrorism
surveillance program," Ms. Wilson said in a
telephone interview. She said Congress
needed to investigate further to determine
how the program is run.
Democrats have pledged to investigate the
N.S.A. program and other counterterrorism
programs they say may rely on excessive
presidential authority. Senator Charles E.
Schumer of New York said the
announcement appeared to be intended in
part to head off criticism Mr. Gonzales was
likely to face at Thursday's judiciary
committee hearing.
"I don't think the timing is coincidental,"
Mr. Schumer said in a telephone interview.
"They knew they had a very real problem,
and they're trying to deflect it."
But Justice Department officials said the
timing of the announcement was driven
solely by the FISA court's notification in
recent days that it had approved the new
orders. The officials said the orders were the
result of two years of discussing with the
court how to bring the eavesdropping
program under court review, a process they
said began long before the program become
public.
A Justice Department official said the
department would file a motion with the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Cincinnati, arguing that the court's review
of the issue in a lawsuit brought by the
American Civil Liberties Union "is now
moot" in light of this week's developments.
But several legal analysts said the issue
might not be resolved that simply.
Bruce Fein, a Justice Department official in
the Reagan administration who has been
critical of the program, said the appellate
court was likely to send the issue back to the
trial court to re-examine the issue.
Anthony D. Romero, executive director of
the A.C.L.U., said the appellate court should
still examine the legality of the program and
whether the it had violated intelligence law
for the last five years.
"It's not academic when the president
violates the law." Mr. Romero said.
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